

Error-Free Perfect-Secrecy Systems

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
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#### Introduction



• A system satisfies perfect secrecy if I(U; X) = 0.

 $I(U;X) = D(P_{UX} || P_U P_X) = \sum_{ux} P_{UX}(ux) \log \frac{P_{UX}(ux)}{P_U(u)P_X(x)} = 0$  $\Leftrightarrow P_{UX}(ux) = P_U(u)P_X(x) \quad \forall u, x$ 


Error-free means H(U/XR) = 0, *i.e.*, U = g(X, R).



# Introduction

- Perfect secrecy was studied in [Shannon1949] [Massey 1988].
- Theorem [Shannon's perfect secrecy theorem]
  If *I*(*U*; *X*) = 0 and *H*(*U* | *RX*) = 0, then

 $H(R) \ge H(U)$ 






### Introduction

Definition 1 A cipher system is called an Error-free Perfect-Secrecy (EPS) system if

 $H(U \mid RX) = 0$  zero decoding error

I(U; X) = 0 perfect secrecy

I(U;R) = 0 no side information




### Lower Bounds on Resources


Theorem 1 Let *U* be the support of *U*. For an EPS system {*R*, *U*, *X*}, max<sub>*x*</sub> *P*<sub>*X*</sub>(*x*) ≤ |*U*|<sup>-1</sup>, and max<sub>*r*</sub> *P*<sub>*R*</sub>(*r*) ≤ |*U*|<sup>-1</sup>.
Consequently,  $H(X) \ge \log |\mathcal{U}|,$ 

and  $H(R) \ge \log |\mathcal{U}|.$ 


If the source is not uniform,  $\log |\mathcal{U}| > H(U)$  and hence, H(R) > H(U)









Due to I(U;R) = 0, the area of each cell =  $P_U(u) P_R(r) = P_{UR}(u, r)$ 






R 2 3 4 5 6 ... 1 1 2 1 . . . 3 2 1 U• M


Due to H(U|XR) = 0, the same value of X cannot be assigned to the same column.



Due to H(U|XR) = 0, the same value of X cannot be assigned to the same column.



Consider X = 1.



Since the total length of all red lines is less or equal to 1,  $M P_X(1) \le 1$ , and hence  $P_X(1) \le M^{-1}$ 

# Lower Bounds on Resources

• Theorem 1 Let U be the support of U.

 $\begin{array}{c} H(U \mid RX) = 0\\ I(U;X) = 0\\ I(U;R) = 0 \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \begin{array}{c} \max_{x} P_X(x) \le |\mathcal{U}|^{-1} \\ \max_{r} P_R(r) \le |\mathcal{U}|^{-1} \end{array} \Rightarrow \begin{array}{c} H(X) \ge \log |\mathcal{U}| \\ H(R) \ge \log |\mathcal{U}| \end{array}$ 

- $\blacksquare$  *H*(*R*) measures the initial key requirement
- H(X) measures the number of channel use
- **D**ata compression cannot help to reduce H(X)
- These are constrained non-Shannon type inequalities

# Countably Infinite $\mathcal{U}$

- Theorem 2 No EPS system can be constructed for  $|\mathcal{U}| = \infty$ , i.e., U is defined on a countably infinite support or a support with unbounded size.
  - Theorem 1 shows that H(R) and H(X) is large if the cardinality of the support of *U* is large regardless how small H(U) is.
  - If  $|\mathcal{U}| = \infty$ , at least one of the following assumptions has to be dropped.

 $H(U \mid RX) = 0$  zero decoding error

I(U;X) = 0 perfect secrecy

I(U;R) = 0 no side information



# **Achievablity Part**

Theorem 3 If  $|\mathcal{U}| < \infty$ , there exists an EPS system such that  $H(X) = H(R) = \log |\mathcal{U}|$ .

Proof: One-time pad.

• Let  $M = |\mathcal{U}|$ .

• Let *R* be uniformly distributed in  $\{1, 2, ..., M\}$ .

• Let  $X = (U + R) \mod M$ .



Corollary 4 If H(U|RX) = I(U;X) = I(U;R) = 0, then  $\left[a^{H(U)}\right] \le a^{H(X)}$ 

where logarithms are with respect to base *a*.

Proof: By Theorem 1,

 $H(U) \le \log |\mathcal{U}| \le H(X).$ 

Therefore,

$$a^{H(U)} \leq |\mathcal{U}| \leq a^{H(X)}.$$

Remark: Corollary 4 generalizes Theorem 1 in [Matúš 2006], which has an extra assumption H(X|UR) = H(R|UX) = 0.

#### Example

Suppose the sender and the receiver share a secret key  $R = \{B_1, B_2, \dots, B_n\}$ , where  $B_i$  are i.i.d. with distribution  $P_R$  such that  $P_R(0) = P_R(1) = 0.5$ . • Let  $P_{II}(0) = 0.5$  and  $P_{II}(1) = P_{II}(2) = 0.25$ .  $P_{B_{n+1}} = P_B$ Let  $(U'_1, U'_2) = \begin{cases} (0, B_{n+1}) & \text{if } U = 0\\ (1, 0) & \text{if } U = 1\\ (1, 1) & \text{if } U = 2 \end{cases}$ 

• Let  $X = (U'_1 \oplus B_1, U'_2 \oplus B_2).$ 

The receiver can decode  $(U'_1, U'_2)$  from X and R.

## Example (cont')

$$P_U(0) = 0.5 \text{ and } P_U(1) = P_U(2) = 0.25.$$

$$R' = \begin{cases} (B_3, B_4, \dots, B_n, B_{n+1}) & \text{if } U = 0\\ (B_3, B_4, \dots, B_n) & \text{if } U = 1 \text{ or } 2 \end{cases}$$


#### The expected key consumption:

$$P_U(0) \cdot 1 + P_U(1) \cdot 2 + P_U(2) \cdot 2 = 1.5$$
  
= H(U)  
= I(R;UX)

The residual R' can be used in the next round.



# Multiple Use



The system satisfies

H(U | RX) = 0 H(V | RXY) = 0 I(U;X) = 0 I(UV;XY) = 0I(U;R) = 0 I(V;R) = 0


• Theorem 5 If I(UV; XY) = H(U | RX) = H(V | RXY) = 0

and I(U;R) = I(V;R) = 0,

then  $H(V|U) \le H(R|U,X)$ 

Proof: Constrained Shannon type inequality

- After the first transmission, the maximum amount of information that can still be transmitted secretly will be upper bounded by H(R/UX) = H(R) I(R;UX)
- $\blacksquare$  H(R) is the size of the key shared at the beginning.
- I(R; UX) seems to be the "amount of key" that has been consumed during the first transmission.



 $R_{2}$ 

- Suppose an EPS system  $(U_i, R_i, X_i)$  is continuously and independently used.
- Both the sender and the receiver know { $(U_i, R_i, X_i)$ , i = 1, 2, ...}
- Suppose the sender and the receiver aims to generate a new common secret key  $S^m = (S_1, ..., S_m)$

• The new common secret key  $S^m = (S_1, ..., S_m)$ .

Suppose S<sub>i</sub> are i.i.d. with generic random variable S.
 We require

 $I(S^{m}; U^{j}, X^{j}) = 0 \quad \text{for all } j$  $H(S^{m} | R^{j}, X^{j}) = 0 \quad \text{for sufficiently large } j$ 

- Using S<sup>m</sup> will not disclose any information about the previous system uses
- Both sender and the receiver can generate the same S<sup>m</sup> without any error.

• Let  $N_m$  be a random variable such that

$$H(S^m | R^{N_m}, X^{N_m}) = 0$$

where  $R^{N_m} = (R_1, ..., R_{N_m})$  and  $X^{N_m} = (X_1, ..., X_{N_m})$ .

It is sufficient to use the EPS system  $N_m$  times to generate  $S^m$ .

■  $N_m$  is random because the realization of  $N_m$  depends on the realizations of { $(U_i, R_i, X_i), i = 1, 2, ...$ }.  $H(S^m)$ 

- We are interested to know  $\mathbf{E}[N_m]$
- Roughly speaking, this is the expected rate of generating a new key per system use.

Theorem 6 Consider a sequence of i.i.d. EPS system {(U<sub>i</sub>, R<sub>i</sub>, X<sub>i</sub>), i = 1, 2, ...} with generic random variables (U, R, X). For any given P<sub>S</sub> and positive integer m, we can construct S<sup>m</sup> from N<sub>m</sub> system uses such that

$$I(S^{m}; U^{j}, X^{j}) = 0 \text{ for all } j$$
$$H(S^{m} | R^{N_{m}}, X^{N_{m}}) = 0$$

$$\lim_{m \to \infty} \frac{H(S^m)}{\mathbf{E}[N_m]} \ge H(R \mid UX).$$


Furthermore,  $H(R \mid UX) \ge \frac{H(S^m)}{\mathbf{E}[N_m]}$ 

Then

- H(R | X, U) is the amount of key that can be extracted after each use of the system
  - I(R;XU) is the expected key consumption in every use of an EPS system

■ Theorem 7 For any EPS system,  $I(R;UX) = H(R) - H(R | X,U) \ge H(U)$ 

 $I(R;UX) = H(U) \iff I(R;X) = 0$ 



- Example 2 Suppose U and R are independent and both uniformly distributed on sets {0, 1, ..., 2<sup>i</sup> - 1} and {0, 1, ..., 2<sup>j</sup> - 1}, respectively, where i ≤ j.
- $\blacksquare$  R' is *i* random bits extracted from R

 $\blacksquare X = U \oplus R'.$ 

I(R;UX) = H(R) - H(R | UX) = H(R) - H(R | R') = j - (j - i)= H(U)

# **Partition Code**


- Let  $M = /\mathcal{U}/$  and assume  $M < \infty$ .
- Let  $\Psi = (\psi_1, ..., \psi_M) \in \mathcal{N}^M$  and  $\theta = \sum_{i=1}^M \psi_i$
- Definition 2 A partition code  $C(\Psi)$  encodes U as follows.

• Set 
$$i = U$$
.

• A' is randomly picked from the set  $\{1, ..., \psi_i\}$  with a uniform distribution.

• Let 
$$A = \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \psi_j + A' - 1$$
,

*R* be uniformly distributed on the set  $\{0, 1, ..., \theta - 1\}$  and  $X = (A + R) \mod \theta$ .



# **Partition Code**

Partition code satisfies all the constraints in an EPS system.

Furthermore,

$$H(X) = H(R) = \log \theta$$

and

$$I(R;U,X) = \sum_{i=1}^{M} P_U(i) \log \frac{\theta}{\psi_i} = H(U) + D(P_U || Q_U),$$

where  $Q_U(i) = \theta^{-1} \psi_i$ 

Theorem 8 Suppose  $P_U(u)$  is rational for all u. Let  $\theta$  be an integer such that  $\theta \cdot P_U(u)$  is an integer for all u. Let  $\Psi = (\psi_i)$  with  $\psi_i = \theta \cdot P_U(u)$ . Then the partition code  $C(\Psi)$  achieves the minimum expected key consumption, i.e., I(R; U, X) = H(U).

- H(X) represents the number of channel uses to convey the ciphertext *X*.
- In addition to minimizing I(R; U, X), we want to minimize H(X) simultaneously

- Theorem 9 Let X,  $\mathcal{R}$ , and  $\mathcal{U}$  be the supports of X, R, and U, respectively.
  - H(U | RX) = 0 I(U; X) = 0 I(U; R) = 0 I(R; X) = 0 H(U | RX) = 0 H(
- Note that  $\inf_{u \in \mathcal{U}} P_U(u) \le |\mathcal{U}|^{-1}$  where equality holds if and only if  $P_U$  is a uniform distribution.

Corollary 10 Suppose  $\{R_n, U_n, X_n\}$  satisfy  $H(U_n | R_n X_n) = I(U_n; X_n) = I(U_n; R_n) = I(R_n; X_n) = 0$ and  $H(U_n) > 0$  for all n. Then  $\lim_{n \to \infty} H(U_n) = 0 \implies \lim_{n \to \infty} H(R_n) = \lim_{n \to \infty} H(X_n) = \infty$ 


Theorem 11 Suppose  $\{R, U, X\}$  satisfy H(U | RX) = I(U; X) = I(U; R) = I(R; X) = 0.If  $P_U(u)$  is irrational for any  $u \in U$ , then  $|X| = |\mathcal{R}| = \infty.$ 

#### Constrained non-Shannon Type Inequalities

X

0

a



Thm. 1 in [Matúš 2006]

a

-*a* 

Ch. 15 in [Yeung 2008]

U


0

a

R

 $U \bigcirc a \land X$   $-a \land b$   $R \land d$ 

Thm. 1-3, Cor. 4



Thm. 9, Cor. 10, Thm. 11 P.32



# Min. Number of Channel Uses

- Theorem 1 tells that  $H(X) \ge \log |\mathcal{U}|$ .
- We aim to minimize I(R; XU) subject to  $H(X) = \log |\mathcal{U}|$ .


■ If one-time pad is used,

 $H(U) \leq \log |\mathcal{U}| = H(X) = H(R) = I(R; XU).$ 

The effective key consumption I(R; XU) is not minimal when the source U is not uniform.


# Min. Number of Channel Uses

Theorem 12 For an EPS system, if  $H(X) = \log |\mathcal{U}|$ , then  $I(R; UX) = \log |\mathcal{U}|$  and H(X|RU) = 0.



# A Fundamental Tradeoff

The minimum expected key consumption and the minimum number of channel use cannot be achieved simultaneously.



# Conclusion

- We have studied perfect-secrecy systems with the assumption that the message and the secret key are independent.
- Under this setup, we have shown a new bound  $\log |\mathcal{U}| \le H(R)$  which is tighter than the one  $H(U) \le H(R)$ .
- If |U| = ∞, no security system can simultaneously achieve:
   i) perfect secrecy, ii) zero decoding error, iii) no side information.
- A new notion called effective key consumption *I*(*R*;*UX*) is defined.
   It measures the amount of key used in an EPS system.
- If  $P_U$  is not uniform, the expected key consumption and the number of channel use cannot be minimized at the same time.
- There exists a fundamental tradeoff between these two parameters.

Q & A